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Abstract 
 
Concern over unprecedentedly low levels of childbearing in Europe has become increasingly 
marked among both scientists and policy-makers. In conjunction with these concerns over 
fertility,  there  has  also  been  considerable  debate  on  the  role  migration  can  play  in 
compensating for fertility below the replacement level.   
 
The issue of how to measure inter-generational replacement has been addressed by several 
scholars in recent years. In this paper we make use of a very simple method to assess how far 
migration alters the extent of replacement for a birth cohort as it ages.  
 
We term the measure used here the overall  replacement  ratio (ORR).  It is calculated by 
taking the size of a female birth cohort divided by the average size of the cohorts of mothers 
in the year of birth. For example, we can compare the size of the 1975 cohort over time to the 
number of women in the main childbearing ages in 1975. Using annual estimates of the size 
of  the  1975  cohort  enables  us  to  track  the  impact  of  migration  on  its  implied  level  of 
replacement. Where immigration is significant, the ratio climbs over time, often reaching the 
replacement  level  by  the  age  of  30  in  many  countries  where  fertility  is  well  below  the 
replacement level. The paper presents estimates of the ORR for a range of European countries 
representing different replacement regimes. In contrast with a frequently expressed notion of a 
limited impact of migration on population trends in Europe, we demonstrate that for many 
countries net migration has become a key factor in their population trends during the last 
decades.   5 
Key  words:  Population  trends,  Europe,  replacement  level  fertility,  migration,  Overall 
replacement ratio. 
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Introduction 
A population’s history of fertility, mortality and migration is written into its age structure, 
revealing the extent to which generations are replacing themselves. In this paper we propose 
an easily calculated measure that enables us to track how these three processes determine the 
extent of inter-generational replacement. Since mortality is low in most European countries 
until well after the reproductive ages, it plays a very limited role in determining replacement. 
Therefore, for European populations, population replacement is principally influenced by the 
combined effects of fertility and migration. 
 
Concern over unprecedentedly low levels of childbearing and potential population decline in 
Europe has become increasingly marked among both scientists and policy-makers. National 
governments,  the  European  Commission  and  even  Pope  Benedict  XVI  have  highlighted 
Europe’s low level of fertility as a challenge to long-term social and economic sustainability, 
while demographers have devoted considerable scholarly attention to explaining why the birth 
rate is so low and what might be done to raise it (McDonald 2002, Demeny 2003, European 
Commission 2005, Vatican 2006). 
 
In conjunction with the concerns over fertility, there has also been considerable debate on the 
role migration can play in compensating for fertility below the replacement level. In 2000, the 
United  Nations  report  Replacement  migration:  Is  it  a  solution  to  declining  and  ageing 
population? triggered extensive (and very diverse) media comment on the matter, with many 
of the official responses of governments being unusually sharp (Teitelbaum 2004). In most 
cases, there appeared to be great reluctance to accept that large-scale immigration could be a 
structural feature of European societies. These views were broadly in line with some earlier 
studies suggesting that large-scale immigration is not politically viable in Europe (Teitelbaum 
and Winter 1985) 
 
However, during the media frenzy set off by the United Nation’s, few people paused to ask if 
any European countries already experience migration levels that can be seen as constituting 
‘replacement migration.’ Although some evidence suggests this may be the case, no clear 
definition  of  replacement  migration  exists,  which  often  makes  the  debate  on  this  subject 
inconsistent.  As  Beaujot  (2003:  1)  noted,  “the  idea  of  using  immigration  to  “keep  the 
population the way it was” can be used not only with regard to maintaining a certain growth   7 
rate, or avoiding decline, or preventing ageing, but also with regard to regional distribution, 
even ethnic or linguistic distribution, or socioeconomic composition” (see Lesthaeghe 2001, 
Coleman 2001, Beaujot 2003, and Saczuk 2003 for a critical assessment of the concept). One 
possible conceptualisation of replacement migration assesses whether immigration makes up 
for the difference between the observed number of births and the hypothetical number of 
births  that  would  have  been  achieved  if  fertility  reached  replacement  level.  A  long-term 
combination of sub-replacement fertility and replacement migration could eventually lead to a 
stationary population, i.e., a population with constant size and fixed age structure (under the 
assumption that mortality also remains constant). Examples of just such a process taking place 
over many decades in Northern Italy can be found in Dalla Zuanna (2006).  
 
However, such a concept of replacement migration is not easily analysed because migration 
fluctuates widely over time: hence it is problematic to use migration rates for any particular 
year to estimate long-term population replacement. In order to avoid this volatility, in this 
paper we use a measure that shows the cumulated impact of migration on birth cohort size 
rather than conventional period rates. The measure we propose and the data used to estimate it 
are discussed in the next sections. 
 
Measurement 
Many demographers now accept that the importance of immigration for childbearing trends 
and population change in most developed countries implies the need to rethink the traditional 
concepts of replacement level fertility (Smallwood and Chamberlain 2005). However, in spite 
of the  recognition that this is an important issue, no measure has  yet become  a de facto 
standard. Calot and Sardon (2001) suggest that the ‘net replacement rates’ which reflect both 
mortality and migration are preferable to the widely used ‘net reproduction rates’ and that 
their  inclusion  may  change  the  evaluation  of  future  population  prospects.  This  is  well 
illustrated by Daguet (2002) who computed different measures of generational replacement 
for  France.  Ortega  and  del  Rey  (2007)  have  taken  a  different  approach,  computing  birth 
replacement ratios (BRE), relating period numbers of births to the mean size of the mothers’ 
generation at birth. Preston and Wang (2007) have proposed an alternative method calculating 
the intrinsic growth rate and net reproduction rate in the presence of migration based on age-
specific growth rates. Two further papers that have investigated the links between migration, 
fertility and population dynamics are Ediev et al (2007) and Philipov and Schuster (2010).   8 
Dalla Zuanna (2008) has proposed an index of replacement including migration, RM, that is 
very similar to the measure used in this paper. And, finally, Sobotka (2008) has proposed the 
gross  replacement  rate  (GRE)  that  combines  period  estimates  of  fertility  (the  gross 
reproduction rate in the year of cohort’s birth) with data on subsequent changes in cohort’s 
population size to estimate replacement for each cohort.
1 
 
In this paper we make use of a very simple method to assess how far migration alters the 
extent of replacement for a birth cohort as it ages. In order to avoid all problems associated 
with  the  estimation  of  fertility,  mortality,  and  migration,  we  ignore  the  vital  processes 
altogether,  and  just  present  a  direct  comparison  of  the  size  of  age  groups.  We  term  the 
measure used here the overall replacement ratio (ORR). It is calculated by taking the size of a 
female birth cohort divided by the average size of the cohorts of mothers in the year of birth. 
We use female cohorts to facilitate comparison with conventional fertility indices, but male 
cohorts (or the two sexes combined) could be equally well studied in this way.  
 
Specifically, the overall replacement ratio (ORR) is defined in this paper as follows: 
ORR (a, c) = F(a,t=c+a) / (F(a(20, 35), t=c) / 16)  
 
where a is age, c is the year of birth, F size of the female population, and t calendar year. We 
take 20 and 35 as indicating the limits of the main childbearing ages during the 1970s and 
1980s,  the  birth  cohorts  which  we  are  mostly  studying  here.  We  use  the  population 
distribution  by  age  on  January  1  of  the  subsequent  year  (b+a+1)  to  estimate  female 
population  reaching  age  a  during  the  year  t=b+a.    Other  age  ranges  and  more  complex 
definitions of the average size of the mothers’ cohorts could, of course, be taken, but our 
initial sensitivity analysis suggests that the ORR is not significantly affected by the definition 
of the mothers’ cohorts, as long as the range selected is long enough to wash out effects of 
short-term baby booms and busts. For present purposes we have chosen to keep the definition 
as  simple  as  possible.  Because  our  main  interest  lies  in  tracking  how  the  generation  of 
mothers with below-replacement fertility is subsequently ‘replaced’ by a positive migration 
balance, we focus on tracking the ORR until the ages when their daughters typically become 
                                                 
1 In addition to indicators of population replacement, other measures have been used to estimate the impact of 
migration on the population. Coleman (2009) related period numbers of net migrants to the total number of live 
births, showing that a number of European countries had net migration exceeding 50% of live births around 2008. 
In their projection scenarios for the EU-15 countries (EU members as of 2003), Lutz and Scherbov (2003: 11-12) 
proposed that “the effect of 100,000 additional immigrants per year corresponds to that of an increase in the TFR 
of 0.1.”   9 
mothers themselves. At these ages, cohort survivorship in contemporary developed countries 
is  practically  unaffected  by  mortality,  which  makes  the  ORR  changes  over  time  almost 
entirely determined by fertility and migration. 
 
For example, we compare the size of the 1980 cohort over time to the number of women in 
the main childbearing ages in 1980. Using annual estimates of the size of the 1980 cohort 
enables us to track the impact of migration on its implied level of replacement. In the absence 
of migration, this ratio will remain almost constant for the first decades of life, and then 
decline  as  mortality  reduces  the  size  of  the  cohort.  However,  where  there  is  significant 
immigration, the ratio will rise as the cohort ages, with the increases taking place at the ages 
of immigration.  Conversely, with net emigration, the ratio will decline as the cohort ages.  
 
As is well known, most migrants are usually young adults, thus immigration is a process that 
leads to additions to the size of a birth cohort between roughly the ages of 15 and 40. This age 
pattern of immigration can strongly modify the size of each cohort before it reaches typical 
childbearing ages. For example, it is possible for every cohort to reach the replacement level, 
while some widely used age structure indicators, such as the conventional age pyramid, show 
a striking shortfall in the relative size of the cohort throughout childhood.  
 
In its interpretation and aim, the ORR is very close to the gross replacement rate (GRE) 
proposed by Sobotka (2008). As Appendix 1 shows, we achieve almost identical results using 
the more simply defined ORR as the GRE. 
 
As an illustration, Figure 1 presents estimates of the ORR for female birth cohorts in England 
and Wales from 1972 to 1986. The ratios are based on annual single-year of age population 
estimates from 1972 to 2006 made by the United Kingdom’s Office for National Statistics 
(ONS 2010). The uppermost line (1972 birth cohort) starts above 1 (the replacement-level) 
and  remains  there  throughout  the  next  34  years.  1972  was  the  last  year  in  which  period 
fertility exceeded the replacement level, so all later cohorts begin below 1. No cohorts show 
any marked changes for the first 10-15 years of life, but all rise substantially from the late 
teens on, when significant immigration begins to increase the cohort sizes. The experience of 
each cohort is truncated at its age in 2006, but it is clear that most, if not all, cohorts will pass 
the replacement level. Although not shown in this paper, useful insights can also be obtained   10 
by organizing these data in a different way—either by tracking trends in ORR for all cohorts 
at a few selected ages or by looking at the ORR of different cohorts by calendar years. 
 
Figure 1: Overall Replacement Ratio for England and Wales, cohorts 1972 to 1986 
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Data 
The data we use in the rest of this paper are all taken from Eurostat’s online database. The 
national  statistical  offices  of  all  the  member  states  of  the  European  Union  make  annual 
estimates of their populations by single year of age. These are then collated by Eurostat and 
made  available  (along  with  data  for  selected  other  European  countries)  on  their  website 
(Eurostat 2010). It is important to realize that these data often constitute estimates that differ 
from the ‘true’ population size. Countries calculate the population resident in their territory in 
different  ways;  some—especially  the  Nordic  countries,  but  also  Austria,  Estonia,  the 
Netherlands and Slovenia—can make use of detailed and accurate population registers, others 
have to rely on combinations of vital statistics and decennial censuses, which themselves may 
be deficient in various ways. Thus, the data we are using constitute the “best guesses” of 
Europe’s national statistical offices, which can be affected by different definitions of resident 
population and by different degrees of accuracy in registering immigration and emigration. 
Some statistical offices are at pains to point out the approximate nature of their population   11 
estimates.
2 Nevertheless,  it  is  evident  that  these  “best  guesses”  mostly  provide  highly 
plausible  and  consistent  information  on  the  evolving  population  structures  of  the  EU’s 
member states. The greatest concern over the robustness of the estimates is for some countries 
in  Eastern  Europe  that  have  seen  large-scale  emigration  since  1989  and  where  the 
infrastructure of national statistics is in any event weaker than elsewhere in the EU. In such 
cases, sharp discontinuities are sometimes evident in the series or data only given for certain 
years. Another problematic country for our analysis is Ireland, as the Eurostat site does not 
give a continuous series of annual population estimates by single years of age up until 1985. 
For this reason, we exclude Ireland from our calculations. Overall, however, in most cases the 
data clearly capture the main trends in each country.  
 
Results 
Figure 2 gives the ORR for the EU-14 (i.e. the old EU before the enlargements of 2004 and 
2007 except for Ireland – see above), while Figure 3 presents the same information for eight 
European countries. The birth cohorts chosen run from 1976 to 1986, so that the cohorts’ 
experience is truncated at ages between 23 and 33 in 2009. We selected these cohorts because 
the conventional indicator of fertility, the total fertility rate (TFR) fell below the replacement 
level for the EU-15 in  the mid-1970s. Earlier  cohorts thus had no  ‘need’ of replacement 
migration. Since much migration only happens from the late teens onwards, later cohorts have 
generally not yet had sufficient time to see significant immigration.  
 
The results for the EU-14 in Figure 2 give a clear picture. The initial values of the ORR fall 
steadily over time, as this was a period of rapidly  falling  fertility, especially in Southern 
Europe. However, there is clear upward trend in the ORR as each cohort ages. This pattern 
reflected,  with  some  variations,  in  the  graphs  in  Figure  3  for  the  UK,  Germany,  France, 
Austria  and  Switzerland.  The  lines  all  begin  well  below  one,  sometimes  far  below  (e.g., 
Switzerland), indicating that fertility was below the replacement level. As each cohort ages, it 
usually increases in size, although a few downward movements are also recorded. The ages 
and cohorts at which the largest rises occur also vary to some degree, and the impact of 
specific migration events can be seen. For example, the large rise in each cohort in Germany 
in the early 1990s indicates the influx of refugees from the former Yugoslavia. Whatever the 
                                                 
2 For example, on their website the UK’s Office for National Statistics pointedly comments in the notes 
accompanying their estimates that “These estimates are NOT National Statistics. They do not meet the stringent 
requirements made of National Statistics data and are fit only for certain purposes. These include certain uses 
within population modelling and enabling understanding of population estimates” (emphasis in original).     12 
specific national features, the broad similarity of all five national graphs is apparent. The 
panel for Switzerland shows, perhaps, the most striking and stable pattern of immigration 
systematically  compensating  for  the  shortfall  of  births,  the  result  of  sustained  high 
immigration for several decades.   
 
Figure 2: Overall Replacement Ratio by age for the EU-15 (minus Ireland), cohorts 
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The results for Spain show a somewhat different pattern. Fertility remained higher longer, 
with  the  ORR  not  falling  below  one  until  the  1982  cohort.  The  dramatic  upsurge  of 
immigration into Spain, over the last two decades is also readily seen in the lines plotted. In 
Spain immigration seems to be more than filling the gap in cohort sizes created by very low 
fertility. To some extent the precise track of the Spanish curves may be deemed especially 
conjectural. After all, much of the immigration into Spain has been initially undocumented, 
and only later regularized in a series of amnesties. Nevertheless, there is no ambiguity about 
the scale of replacement migration in Spain. No other country of Europe has seen a similar 
extent of immigration, adding 5.2 million people to the Spanish population of 40 million 
during the first decade of the millennium (Sobotka 2009). With its distinctive combination of 
very low fertility and massive immigration, Spain is an intriguing example of a country with 
fertility far below replacement increasingly combined with huge immigration. The joint effect   13 
of  the  two  processes  is  overall  replacement  ratios  that  are  well-above  replacement  and 
concomitant rapid population growth. 
 
The final two panels in Figure 3 are for the Czech Republic and Hungary. Here we see a very 
different  pattern.  Until  the  end  of  Communism  international  migration  was  all  but  non-
existent  and  so  the  lines  for  each  birth  cohort  run  horizontally,  with  just  a  few  minor 
discontinuities possibly corresponding to mismatches between earlier estimates and updates 
following censuses. But as in the older member states, immigration is also coming to play a 
significant role. In the Czech Republic, from about the time of accession to the EU in 2004, 
the lines curve upwards. The Hungarian results show yet another pattern. Clear discontinuities 
are evident around the time of the collapse of Communism, and thereafter most cohorts show 
a steady increase in the ORR. The increase, which affects all ages, is probably a reflection of 
migration to Hungary of ethnic Hungarians from neighbouring countries, especially Romania.  14 
 
Figure 3: Overall Replacement Ratio for eight European countries, cohorts 1976-1986 
Note: For definition of ORR, see text. Vertical scales differ.  
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Figure 3 continued  16 
Regional comparison 
-  To  provide  a  more  systematic  assessment  of  population  replacement  in  different  parts  of 
Europe, Table 1 summarises overall replacement ratio at ages 0 and 28 for two cohorts of 
women born during a period of declining fertility, 1975 and 1980. Country data are grouped 
by broader regions. The declining fertility of the late 1970s is clearly reflected in the fall or a 
stagnation  of  the  ORR  at  age  0  between  the  two  cohorts  (Germany,  where  fertility  fell 
strongly before 1975, is an exception). However, the trend at age 28 is much less clear-cut, 
with Austria, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom all seeing increases in the ORR 
between the 1975 and 1980 cohorts. In all parts of Europe except Ireland and some Southern 
and  Eastern  European  countries,  the  1980  cohort  was  initially  ‘endowed’  with  sub-
replacement level. By the time this cohort reached age 28, however, the ORR was close to or 
above  the  replacement  level  in  most  cases  and  above  0.9  almost  everywhere  (except  in 
Denmark and parts of post-communist Europe). As a further rise in the ORR is likely to occur 
after age 28, it seems safe to conclude that in a most countries the 1980 cohort will probably 
surpass the value of 1 before its members reach age 40. Only in a number of ex-communist 
countries, has the ORR actually declined, though in a few cases, including Bulgaria and Latvia, 
it  has plummeted,  a  trend  that  is  likely  to  have  long-term  negative  consequences  for  the 
population structure and long-term prospect of population decline.  
 
-  Almost all the countries analysed saw a larger increase in the ORR for the 1980 cohort than 
for the 1975 cohort (Figure 4). The absolute and relative increases in the ORR between ages 0 
and 28 were particularly marked in Spain and Switzerland, with absolute increases of 0.32-
0.33 in the 1980 cohort (Figure 4). Obviously, even countries with very low fertility and net 
reproduction rates around 0.7 (i.e., with the TFR below 1.5) can reach replacement migration 
as early as at age 28. Hungary and the Czech Republic made a transition from a declining 
ORR with age to an increasing one between the 1975 and 1980 cohorts, possibly following an 
earlier pattern of Southern Europe (see Fig. 4 below).  
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TABLE 1: Overall replacement ratio at ages 0 and 28 in female birth cohorts 1975 and 1980, 
15 European countries and EU-14 combined (15 EU member states as of 2003 without Ireland) 
 
  ORR at age 0  ORR at age 28  Abs. increase in 
ORR 
Relative change 
(index): ORR at 
age 28 / ORR at 
age 0 
  C 1975  C 1980  C 1975  C 1980  C 1975  C 1980  C 1975  C 1980 
EU-14  0.95  0.87  1.06  1.01  0.11  0.14  1.11  1.16 
Western Europe               
Belgium  0.87  0.82  0.96  0.95
1  0.09  0.13  1.11  1.16 
France  0.96  0.92  1.02  1.00  0.06  0.07  1.06  1.08 
UK  0.89  0.89  0.98  1.02
1  0.09  0.13  1.10  1.14 
Nordic countries               
Denmark  0.94  0.74  1.02  0.86  0.09  0.12  1.09  1.17 
Sweden  0.85  0.80  0.96  0.95  0.11  0.16  1.12  1.20 
German-speaking               
Austria  0.86  0.85  1.00  1.04  0.15  0.19  1.17  1.22 
Germany  0.71  0.79  0.85  0.95  0.15  0.16  1.21  1.20 
Switzerland  0.75  0.75  0.97  1.07  0.22  0.32  1.30  1.43 
Southern Europe               
Italy  1.06  0.80  1.11  0.93  0.05  0.13  1.05  1.16 
Portugal  1.34  1.04  1.33  1.13  -0.01  0.10  1.00  1.09 
Spain  1.34  1.06  1.51  1.39  0.17  0.33  1.13  1.31 
Central & Eastern Europe             
Hungary  1.15  0.89  1.11  0.93  -0.04  0.04  0.97  1.05 
Czech Republic  1.19  0.94  1.18  0.98  -0.01  0.05  0.99  1.05 
Bulgaria  1.17  0.95  0.92  0.83  -0.25  -0.12  0.79  0.88 
Latvia  1.01  0.94  0.91  0.87  -0.10  -0.07  0.90  0.92 
 
Note: 1 ORR for the 1980 cohort measured at age 27 instead of 28 
 
 
The scatterplot in Figure 5 adds another dimension to this comparison. Though almost all the 
countries have moved to a below-replacement ORR at age 0 (ORR on the x axis lower than 1), 
this is not necessarily so by age 28. It also shows that for the EU-14 (2003 EU member states 
excluding Ireland) reaches an ORR around 1 by age 28. It further indicates that the ORR rises 
with age in all non-Eastern European countries (i.e., the points in Figure 5 are clustered above 
the diagonal). And, finally, it reveals that the initially rather close correlation between the 
ORR at age 0 and at age 28, as depicted for the 1975 cohort, does not hold much for the 1980 
cohort, especially if the prominent outlier, Spain, is disregarded.  
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Figure 4: An absolute increase in the ORR between ages 0 and 28, cohorts 1975 and 1980 
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Figure 5: Overall Replacement Ratio at age 0 and at age 28, cohorts 1975 (blue diamonds) 
and  1980  (red  triangles)  in  15  European  countries.  Total  for  the  EU-14  shown  by  large 
symbols. 
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Conclusions and implications 
The results presented here are based on simple (perhaps even simplistic) comparisons. Yet 
they  throw  a  clear  light  on  the  nature  of  population  dynamics  in  many  parts  of  Europe, 
especially in the European Union, suggesting strongly that projections of Europe’s imminent 
demographic demise are far from realistic. In much of Europe it is manifestly clear that, while 
the idea of replacement migration as proposed by the United Nations in 2000 was widely 
criticized,  in  reality  this  is  precisely  what  is  happening.  Perhaps  some  of  the  polemic 
surrounding the UN’s publication was an indication that the idea was too close to the truth for 
comfort?  
 
The pattern of replacement migration was first established in Western Europe and has since 
spread to include the richer parts of Southern Europe. Frequently, the impact of migration 
goes well beyond a small ‘topping up’ of population numbers; countries such as Spain or 
Switzerland  show  that  even  very  low  levels  of  fertility  rates  can  be  combined  with 
replacement levels of migration. The richer countries among those that joined the EU in 2004 
(e.g. the Czech Republic and Slovenia) are showing the clear signs in the same direction. 
There are, of course, exceptions from this general trend and many region-specific patterns. 
Some rich countries, including Germany and the Netherlands, have experienced short periods 
of net emigration and the recent economic recession may bring net emigration to yet more 
countries for some years to come. Moreover, some of the poorer EU member states, especially 
the Baltic countries, Bulgaria, and Romania are still seeing substantial emigration. However, 
taking a longer time perspective, the waves of emigrants from countries such as Poland or 
Romania today have a parallel in mass emigration from Portugal, Spain and Italy from the 
1950s to the 1970s. All three of these Southern European countries have since switched to 
becoming large net ‘importers’ of people. If their experience is a valid guide, the countries 
that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 can expect similar reversals in due course, and the 
establishment of large-scale replacement migration.  
 
By  itself,  replacement  migration  is  not  a  remedy  to  Europe’s  problems  with  an  ageing 
population, but rather it can be seen as a potential opportunity that should be complemented 
with  policies  that  aim  to  enhance  socio-economic  sustainability,  including  supporting  the 
integration  of  migrants,  increased  labour  participation  of  women,  delayed  retirement,  and 
further increase in higher education attainment for both native and migrant populations.    20 
The measure proposed here, the overall replacement ratio, is a simple, even crude, index. 
When thinking in terms of the two most common notions of replacement migration—one 
viewing  migrants  as  contributing  to  more  births  in  the  country,  and  the  other  perceiving 
migrants as ‘filling the gap’ in population size attributable to sub-replacement fertility—the 
ORR focuses on the second perspective. It is easy to compute, can be compared over time and 
across countries, and is intuitively understandable. In spite of its simplicity, it performs as 
well  as  some  more  sophisticated  cohort  replacement  measures  and  is,  under  normal 
circumstances, insensitive to the definition of mother’s cohort. In the absence of huge sudden 
shifts in mothers’ cohort size, the error resulting from an estimation of mother’s cohort size, 
rather than its’ precise measurement, is likely to be of a considerably smaller magnitude than 
the errors and definition problems contained in the official population data for many countries. 
The overall replacement ratio does not aim to substitute for any of the existing and more 
sophisticated measures of population dynamics, but we think it can play a useful role as a 
simple  measure  for  indicating  the  combined  effects  of  fertility  and  migration  on  inter-
generational replacement.   
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Appendix 1 
 
A comparison of the Gross Replacement Rate with the Overall Replacement 
Ratio 
 
 
The Overall Replacement Ratio (ORR) is based on the same underlying idea as the 
Gross Replacement Rate (GRE) proposed by Sobotka (2008). Both indicators aim to 
measure the extent to which migration modifies the population size of birth cohorts as 
they age and to assess whether migration partly or fully compensates for the effects of 
subreplacement  fertility  as  initially  small  cohorts  of  women  approach  their  prime 
reproductive period. Therefore, both indicators are particularly useful for analysing 
population  dynamics  at  relatively  young  ages  (through  30-35),  especially  among 
women. The GRE for the female cohort c at age a is computed by multiplying the 
gross reproduction rate (GRR) of the year b=c when the cohort was born with the 
ratio of the cohorts’ size F at age a to the initial cohort size (i.e., by the number of 
female live births in the year b=c): 
GRE(a,c) = F(a,t=c+a) / BF(b)  · GRR(b) =  F(a,t=b+a) / BF(b)  · TFR(b) · BF(b) / 
B(b)  
 
where BF(b) is the number of female live births in the year b=c.  
 
As in the case of the overall replacement ratio, the gross replacement rate in fact 
measures population replacement for the mothers of a given birth cohort of ‘children’. 
For instance, the GRE for the 1976 cohort measures population replacement among 
women who were giving birth in 1976. With some simplification, their replacement 
consisted  of  two  waves:  first,  in  1976  when  they  were  giving  birth  and  later, 
especially in the 1990s and 2000s, when the size of their children’s cohort expanded 
through immigration.  
 
Theoretically, the ORR may diverge from the GRE for two reasons: First, the ORR 
does not account for the effects of mortality before and during the childbearing years 
among the generation of mothers of a given cohort. This effect is likely to lead to a 
minor upward bias in the ORR. Second, an approximation of the mothers’ cohort size   25 
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by a simple fixed age group in the ORR may cause deviations from the GRE, which 
properly controls for the size of mothers’ cohort.  
 
Because of the simplifications contained in the computation of the ORR, we might 
expect it to be less stable and slightly higher than the GRE. To study this difference 
we  have  carried  out  a  comparison  of  these  two  indices.  Here  we  present  as  an 
illustration the results for four female birth cohorts (1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990) in 
Spain.  Surprisingly,  both  indicators  show  an  almost  perfect  overlap  and  become 
distinguishable only when inspected on a detailed scale (Figure A1). As expected, the 
ORR reaches slightly higher values, but this minor difference, almost always below 
1%, is remarkably consistent across cohorts and over age groups. Contrary to our 
expectations, under normal circumstances the ORR shows no more instability than the 
GRE, nor any significant deviations from that measure. Overall, this similarity leads 
us  to  a  positive  assessment  of  the  ORR,  whose  performance  matches  the  more 
sophisticated measure of cohort replacement. 
 
Figure A1: A comparison of the ORR and GRE for Spain, female birth cohorts 
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